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26

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
---oooOooo--MAVIS WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 15934

-vsFIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant and
Respondent.
---oooOooo---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
---oooOooo--NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant to
recover Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) which represents
the face amount of an insurance policy which plaintiffappellant alleges was issued or should have been issued by
defendant-respondent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted defendant-respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the Summary
Judgment entered by the Lower Court.
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-2STATE!'lENT OF FACTS
In stating the relevant facts, references to deposition
transcripts will be made by stating the surname of the
witness and the page number of the deposition transcript.
References to exhibits will be made by stating the surname
of the witness whose deposition contains the exhibit and
the exhibit number.
The principle figures in this action are plaintiffappellant, Mavis Williams and a former defendant in this
action, Allen Meikle.
Havis Williams is the widow of Dean Williams who
died on April 19, 1976.

Dean Williams is the individual

who submitted an applicdtion for life insurance coverage to
Allen Meikle on April 13, 1976.
Allen Meikle is a part-time insurance salesman who was
requested by !1avis Williams to seek life insurance coverage
for Dean Williams.

Allen l'leikle and Mrs. Williams were co-

employees at Hill Air Force Base and the two had been
friends for approximately eight years before the transactions
herein described took place (Williams, p. 6).

Mr. Meikle is an

agent for Occidental Life Insurance Company (Meikle, p. 6) and
on occasion acts as a broker in locating coverage in other
companies that he does not normally represent (Meikle p. 4).
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-3Prior to the events described herein, Allen Meikle had
never sold, or attempted to sell a policy for First Colony
(Heikle, P· 50-51)·

In fact, there had been no prior contract

whatsoever between Meikle and First Colony (Meikle, p. 49-51).
Other persons involved in the transactions herein
described are Kenneth Bischoff and Lowell Smith.

Messrs.

Bischoff and Smith are partners engaged full time in the
insurance business (Bischoff, pp. 6-7, 52).

The partnership

is the agent for Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company
(Bischoff, p. 4).

However, the partnership also acts as a

broker in locating coverage for appl1cants in other companies
that the partnership does not normally represent (Bischoff,
p. 5).

As in the case with Allen Meikle, neither Bischoff,

Smith nor their agency had any association with First Colony
prior to the incident described herein (Bischoff, p. 5).
First Colony Life Insurance Company is a life underwriter.

It is represented in the State of Utah by its agent,

United Underwriters Company.
A.

Circumstances Leading up to Application for Insurance.
Mavis Williams and Allen Meikle were co-employees at

Hill Air Force Base and had been acquainted for many years
prior to the incidents and transactions described herein
(Williams, p. 6) .

By reason of this association, Mrs. Williams

was aware that Mr. Meikle was a part-time life insurance
salesman and also acte d as an

l'nsurance

broker (Williams, p. 13).
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-4In 1969, Navis Williams requested Allen Meikle to investigate the possibility of procuring life insurance coverage for
her husband, Dean Williams (Williams, pp. 13-14).

Meikle

responded that he would "check around" with several companies
to find the coverage (Williams, p. 14).

Mr. Meikle was

successful in obtaining coverage with Occidental Life Insurance
Company, the underwriter that he represented (Williams, p. 14).
After the policy was issued, Mrs. Williams complained
to

~tr.

Meikle that the provisions of the Occidental policy were

unsatisfactory and she asked if he would make some effort to
locate other coverage (Williams, pp. 19-21).

After some

investigation, Mr. Meikle informed I1rs. Williams that he had
located a more satisfactory policy and advised her to cancel
the Occidental

pol~cy

(Williams, pp. 19-23).

In mid-1974

pursuant to Meikle's advice, Mrs. Williams cancelled the
Occidental policy and gave Mr. Meikle a check for the first
premium on the new policy (Williams, pp. 21, 24).

After

delivery of the premium check Mrs. Williams heard nothing for
approximately one year (Williams, p. 23).

After a one year

period, Mr. Meikle returned Mrs. Williams' check and informed
her that no policy had been obtained (Williams pp. 23-25).
Mrs. Williams did not recall the name of the company involved
(Williams p. 28).
When Mr. Meikle returned the premium check and advised
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-5Mrs. Williams that no insurance had been obtained, she
requested that he continue to look for a sa t"1s f actory policy
(Williams, p. 28).
Mr. Williams had a problem with high blood pressure
a condition noted by the examining physician at the time of
the application for the Occidental policy (Meikle, Ex. 1).
By reason of this condition the prior Occidental policy had
been subject to a rated premium (Meikle, p. 11).

Thus,

Meikle knew that finding coverage would be difficult (Meikle,
p. 9-10).

Therefore, Meikle sought the assistance of Kenneth

Bischoff in locating a company willing to accept the risk
(Meikle, p. 9).

Meikle delivered to Bischoff the medical

portion of the Occidental insurance application (attached as
Ex. 1 to the Meikle deposition) which noted a history of high
blood pressure (Meikle, pp. 16-17; Bischoff pp. 12, 18).
Kenneth Bischoff contacted United Underwirters and
requested its assistance in locating coverage (Bischoff p. 12).
A short time thereafter, United Underwriters contacted Mr.
Bischoff and informed him that the information had been forwarded to First Colony Life Insurance Company (Bischoff, pp.
12-13).

Thereafter, First Colony responded by forwarding to

Bischoff a letter dated February 18, 1976 (attached as Ex.
1 to the Bischoff deposition) wherein the company offered to

consider the risk upon specific conditions, i.e., that an
application be prepared and submitted, that a medical examination
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-6with three blood pressure readings, and that the company
receive a urine specium and x-rays.

Mr. Bischoff then held

a meeting with Meikle to review the conditions of coverage
(Bischoff pp. 16-17).
Upon receipt of the letter dated February 18, 1976 and
the blank application forms, Mr. Meikle visited the home of
Dean and Mavis Williams on April 13, 1976.

After some dis-

cussion they decided to reduce the amount of coverage from
$25,000.00 to $15,000.00 (Williams pp. 36-37).

The application

was completed and signed by Dean and Mavis Williams

(Bischoff,

Ex. 3).
The initial premium for the contemplated coverage was
computed at $65.88.

Mavis Williams drew a check for that

amount and delivered the check to Mr. Meikle.

In return,

Mr. Meikle delivered to Mrs. Williams a "Conditional Receipt"
for the money (copy of Conditional Receipt attached as Ex. 2
to the Bischoff deposition).

The Conditional Receipt clearly

sets forth the conditions to coverage:
"This receipt is to be issued only if
payment is made at the time the application is
signed; otherwise it must not be detached.
Unless the condition specified in paragraph "FIRST" are fulfilled exactly, no insurance
will become effective prior to policy delivery.
Neither the agent nor the medical examiner is
authorized to alter or waive these conditions.
Received from Mavis Williams this 13th
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-7day of ~pril, 1976, the sum of $65.88 in
~onnect~on Wlt~ this application for life
lnsurance to Flrst Colony Life Insurance c
· h app 1 lcat~on
·
·
wh ~c
bears the same date and ompany,
number as this receipt.
FIRST. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT UNDER WHICH INSURANCE
MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY.
If the following conditions shall have been fulfilled exactly:
(a) All m7dical exami~ations, tests, x-rays,
and electrocard~ograms requ~red by published
company rules must be completed;

(c) On the date that the insurance becomes
effective in accordance with the provisions of
this Receipt, each ?erson to be covered must
be insurable at the class of risk applied for
under the company's rules for the plan and the
amount of insurance applied for without modification and at the rate of premium paid.
then insurance as provided by the terrr,s and
conditions of the policy applied for and for
an amount not exceeding that specified in
paragraph "SECOND" will become effective on
the latest of the following dates: {a)
the date of Part 1 of this application;
(b) the date of Part 1 of the application
for any companion policy, if applicable;
(c) the date of completion of all medical
examinations, tests, x-rays, and electrocardiograms required by publlshed company rules;
and (d) the date of issue, if any, requested
in the application . . . (emphasis added.)
Hrs. Williams acknowledged delivery of the "Conditional
Receipt"

(Williams, p. 50).

Moreover, the "Applicant's

Declaration" written immediately above the signature of Dean
and Mavis Williams on the application specifically noted that
theSponsored
coverage
would
begin
atforthe
time
designated
in the
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
digitization
provided
by the Institute of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8"Conditional Receipt."

(Bischoff, Ex. 3).

During the course of the meeting on April 13, 1976,
Meikle informed Mr. and Mrs. Williams of the necessity of the
physical examination (Williams, p. 43).

Mrs. Williams under-

stood that the medical examination was a requirement of the
policy (Williams, p. 43).
Q.

Okay. What was your understanding of the
purpose of the check?

A.

That was the first premium.
amount of the check.

Q.

Okay.
Is there anything else that you
can remember that was talked about
regarding the effectiveness of this
policy or anything that you or your
husband would be required to do regarding
this policy, other than make your payments
to keep it in effect as you understood?

A.

My husband to meet with the doctor for a
physical, which we were assured was a
routine matter.

Q.

A routine matter.
that?

A.

Mr. Meikle said they had all his medical
records so that this was just a routine
process.

Q.

Mr. Meikle said it was routine.

A.

No. It was just filling a requirement.
(Emphasis added, Williams, pp. 42-43)

$65.88 was the

Now what do you mean by

What is
your understanding of that word 'routine'
in this sense, that it was insignificant?

On the following day, an appointment was made with
Dr. Alvord to conduct the medical examination (Williams,
pp. 43-44).

The examination date was set for April 20, 1976.
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-9-

Prior to leaving the l'lilliams home on April 13, 1976
Hrs. Williams claims that Mr. !1eikle stated: "Well, Dean,
you can live dangerously now because you are completely
covered."

(Williams' Affidavit, Paragraph 5; Williams, p. 40).

It is important to note that at the time of this alleged
statement on April 13, 1976, Allen Meikle had no authority
whatsoever from First Colony Life Insurance Company (Meikle,
p. 50).

In fact, on that date, First Colony Life Insurance

Company was totally unaware that Allen Meikle was in any manner
involved in the transaction.

The "Single Case Agreement"

which defined the relationship between the selling agent
and the issuing company had not even been signed on April 13,
1976

(Meikle, Exhibit 3).

When the "Single Case Agreement"

was finally executed on April 22, 1976, Allen .t-1eikle was not
a party to the agreement (Meikle, Exhibit 3).

Said agree-

ment was between Lowell Smith and First Colony Life
Insurance Company.
The first notice to First Colony Life Insurance Company
that Meikle was involved in the transaction was when the
insurance application was received by the company sometime
after April 13, 1976 (Bischoff, Ex. 3).

Even then, the nature

and extent of Meikle's involvement was not disclosed.

The

application noted on 1 Y that Me ikle was to receive a share
of the sales commission (Bischoff, Ex. 3).
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-10Following the meeting on April 13, 1976, Meikle
forwarded the completed application and premium check to
Kenneth Bischoff who in turn forwarded the same to United
Underwriters.

The matter then awaited the outcome of the

physical examination from Dr. Alvord.
B.

Facts Occurring Subsequent to Application.
On the date prior to the scheduled medical examination,

Dean Williams died of cardio-vascular ailment.

Rather

than notify First Colony of the death, it was decided to
conceal the fact of Mr. Williams death from First Colony
in the hope that a policy would be inadvertantly issued by the
company (Meikle, pp. 39-40; Bischoff, p. 36}.
matter remained

sta~~c

notice that the

cond~t~ons

Thus, the

inasmuch as First Colony was awaiting
to its offer had been fulfilled.

No policy was ever issued by First Colony Life nor was there
any communication from First Colony inconsistent with the
conditions stated in the Receipt which was delivered to
Mrs. Williams on April 13, 1976.
When First Colony was finally informed of the death of
Dean Williams, the company tendered its check for the amount
of the initial premium by mailing the same to Mrs. Williams.
Mrs. Williams refused tender of the premium.
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-11ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM DID NOT CREATE COVERAGE
The circumstances of life insurance applications create
a dilemma for the applicant and the insurance company.

The

company has an interest in obtaining its premium in advance
of coverage but is usually unable to arrange for an immediate
medical examination simultaneous with the receipt of the
premium.

The applicant is interested in immediate coverage

and does not wish to pay the premium if coverage may be
cancelled because of an unfavorable medical examination.
(The dilemma and considerations of the company and applicant
are discussed in Prince v. Western Empire Life Insurance Company,
19 U. 2d

174

428 P. 2d 163

(1967)).

The dilemma is usually resolved in favor of the insurance
company inasmuch as it prepares all of the forms involved in
the application and receipt of the premium.

The usual arrange-

ment is that the company receives the premium and delivers a
receipt noting the immediate effective coverage subject to a
condition subsequent.

The result is a one-sided obligation

that permits the insurance company to escape its obligations
on the basis of circumstances occurring between the time of
the effective date, ~'

(the date the premium is paid) and

the later physical examination.
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-12First Colony Life Insurance Company has not adopted a
one-sided commitment.

Under the terms of First Colony's

Conditional Receipt, there is no possibility that the insurance
company can avoid coverage by the benefit of hindsight.

Unlike

the usual situation where the effective date of the coverage
begins with the receipt of the premium subject to the company's
right to cancel, the First Colony receipt delays the effective
date of the insurance until the medical examination is completed.
In this manner there is no possibility that the company can
earn a premium without undertaking the complete and inescapable
obligation of the coverage.
The case of Long v. United Benefit Life Insurance Inc.,
29 U.2d 204, 507 P.2d 375 (1973) involves an insurance policy
which permits the company to avoid coverage by the benefit
of hindsight.

In that case the insurance company accepted the

applicant's premium and delivered a receipt stating that
coverage, if approved, would begin on the date of the application.

The applicant died subsequent to the application date,

but before the date that the company approved the coverage.
Upon learning of the applicant's death, the company disapproved
the coverage for "confidential reasons."

It was apparent from

the facts of the case that had the applicant not died, the
coverage would have been approved.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-13It was on this basis, ~. the illusory coverage between the application date and the approval date that the court
imposed liability on the insurance company.
The holding of the Lon~ case is inapplicable to the case
at bar.

The First Colony policy has no interium period whereby

the company can disapprove coverage if the applicant dies
before the approval date and collect a premium for such an
illusory coverage if the applicant lives past the approval date.
There are several other aspects of the Long case which
make it inapplicable to the issues before the Court.

In the

Long case, the receipt given to the applicant did not require a
medical examination.

In the instant case, the receipt clearly

made coverage conditional on a medical examination.

In the

Long case, the salesman was unquestionably an agent of the
insurance company and gave the applicant an oral binder of
coverage.

In the instant case, there is no basis for an agency

relationship between Mr. Meikle and the insurance company.
On the contrary, the facts establish that Mr. Meikle was acting
as the agent of Mr. and Mrs. Williams (see Point III, infra).
The Receipt in the Long case did not specifically state that
it was "conditional."

Thus, when coupled with payment of

the premium, an ambiguity was created as to whether coverage
existed.

However, the insurance company in the instant case,

clearly designated the receipt as conditional.

The insurance
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-14company in the Long case was not prejudice by the decision
imposing coverage inasmuch as there was nothing to indicate
that it would have disapproved the risk.

In the instant case,

there was evidence prior to the medical examination which made
coverage questionable and the absence of a medical examination
clearly demonstrates that the insurance company was not yet
advised of the risk.
Since First Colony has no opportunity to retroactively
avoid the obligations, there is no reason to impose upon the
parties an agreement different than that stated on the
Conditional Receipt.

In this case, we are not confronted

with the situation where the policy was cancelled by the
insurance company after it had the benefit of hindsight.
Rather, the situation is one where the insurance company
and the insured clearly provided that the coverage never became
effective.

All parties to the contract agreed that the coverage

would be effective on the "the date of completion of all
medical examinations, tests, x-rays and electrograms . . . "
(This was the "latest" date of the four alternative dates
mentioned in the Receipt).

This agreement gave neither party

any means to inequitably escape its obligations and thus the
agreement should be upheld according to its terms.
In those situations where the Conditional Receipt or
other documents dealing with the effective date of the coverage
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-15do not permit the insurance company to escape liability or
collect premiums for an illusory coverage, the courts uphold
the company's denial of coverage.

In Linnastruth v. Mutual

Benefit Health and Accident Association, 137 P.2d 833
(Calif. 1943), the plaintiff's deceased husband made application for insurance with the defendant insurance company.

He

delivered the initial premium to the company subject to the
specific agreement that the insurance would not become effective
until such time as the insurance company actually issued the
policy.

After payment of the premium and completion of the

application, the applicant was involved in an accident which
was within the scope of the coverage.

The

insu~ance

company

denied liability on the basis that the insurance had not yet
taken effect.
The appellant court upheld the decision of the trial
court that despite payment of premium, and the apparent belief
by the applicant that he was covered, there was no liability
on the company since such liability would be contrary to the
provisions of the insurance application which the applicant had
signed.
In Roscoe v. Banker's Life Insurance Company, 526 P.2d
1080 (Ariz. 1974) the plaintiff's deceased husband made application for life insurance to the defendant company and tendered
The
the first annual premium with the signed application.
insurance
company's agent issued a receipt for the annual
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-16premium which specifically provided that a medical examination
was a condition precedent to coverage.

Prior to submitting

to the physical examination, the applicant was killed in an
airplane crash.

The plaintiff in that case commenced an action

alleging many of the points alleged by the plaintiff in the
instant action, i.e., that the insurance coverage should be
effective despite the conditions precedent stated in the
Receipt.
The appellant court upheld the summary judgment granted
by the trial court, holding that coverage did not exist inasmuch
as the conditions precedent to coverage had not been fulfilled.
The basis of the court's decision was as follows:
"We hold c.hc.t where a physical examination and phys:.':lans' medical questionnaire is
required under the terms and provisions found
here, the applicant must arrange for those to
be furnished to the company before his application is completed and before coverage can
arise. • .
The key factor in this case which
distinguishes it from authorities cited by
appellant is the failure of [the applicant]
to obtain the required medical examination,
for without it the essential element of insurability, physical condition, was unknown to
the company."
In Prince v. Western Empire Life Insurance Company,
19 U.2d 174, 428 P.2d 163

(1967), the court found no ambiguity

or inequity in an applicant pre-paying the premium pursuant
to a receipt which postpones coverage until completion of the
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-17required medical examination.
The Court noted that by postponing the effective date
of coverage the insurance company had not created a situation
where it could escape liability or collect a premium for an
illusory coverage.

By postponing the effective date, rather

than having the coverage subject to a condition subsequent,
the Court upheld the fairness of the transaction.

In the course

of the opinion the Court held:
"We think that the binding receipt became
effective on completion of the medical examination
by the company doctor on September 22, 1960, unless
at that time the applicant was not an insurable
risk."
In Aho v. United Transporation Union, 571 P.2d 1329 (Utah,
1977), the applicant and the insurance company negotiated for
the issuance of a life insurance policy and agreed that the
same would become effective when the policy was actually
issued to the applicant.

Thus, like the instant case, there

was no provision for immediate coverage subject to a condition
subsequent, but rather the parties designated a future date
when the policy would become effective.
Although the applicant submitted to a medical examination,
there was further medical information requested that was not
supplied by the applicant.

Prior to supplying the additional

medical information, the insured died.
The Court held that since the insured died prior to the
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-18effective date of the policy, there was no coverage.
The meaning of an insurance contract is determined by
the same rules of construction as any other contract.

Moore v.

Prudential Insurance Company, 26 U.2d 430, 491 P.2d 227 (1971).
The primary rule of construction is that the words used in a
contract will be given their ordinary and usual meaning.
Plain

City Irrigation Company v. Hooper Irrigation Company,

11 U.2d 188, 356 P.2d 625 (1960).

The ordinary and usual

meaning of the words in the Conditional Receipt establish that
the coverage had not commenced at the time of the death of
Dean Williams.
POINT II
THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE
RECEIPT AND APPLICATION

C0~0ITIONAL

In Section I of appellant's Brief, counsel contends
that the Conditional Receipt which was delivered to Mrs.
Williams in exchange for the premium check is ambiguous.
However, after stating the conclusion of ambiguity, counsel
fails to identify the claimed ambiguity and further fails to
designate any language that could reasonably lead an applicant
to believe that coverage would be effective prior to the
physical examination.
As a basis for the claimed ambiguity, appellant has
paraphrased the language in the Conditional Receipt and
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-19suggests that the paraphrased version is clearer than that
in the Receipt.

Even if counsel's language were clearer,

such a comparison provides no support that the language in the
Receipt is ambiguous.

If there is any ambiguity, counsel should

be able to state the ambiguity by quoting the language within
the document itself and then noting the misinterpretation that
can arise from the language.
Counsel argues that reference to the "company rules"
in some unexplained manner leads one to believe that coverage
was immediately effective.

Such an argument is merely an

attempt to search for some basis to insert ambiguity into the
clear statements of the Receipt.
Despite reference to "company rules", the fact remains
that the Conditional Receipt clearly notifies the applicant
that coverage does not begin until a medical examination is
conducted.

Even if the Conditional Receipt were in some manner

ambiguous, the requirements of coverage were clearly transmitted
to Mrs. Williams in other documents.

For example, the

insurance company forwarded an "offer" which specifically noted
the necessity of a physical examination.

The offer specifi-

cally and unequivocally noted the conditions to the offer:
Requirements; application, medical
examination with three blood pressure
readings, home office specimen, x-ray.
(Bischoff, Exhibit D-1).
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-20Kenneth Bischoff testified that upon receipt of this
offer he contacted Meikle and "reviewed it and outlined what
he [Meikle] wotld have to get from Mrs.
p. 16).

Willi~~s"

(Bischoff,

Meikle acknowledged that Bischoff showed him a copy

of the offer wbich specifically stated the requirements
to coverage (Meikle, p. 27).

Mr. Meikle then went to the

Williams residence and showed them the offer (Meikle, p. 2728).

Meikle

examination

tJ~en

discussed arrangements for the medical

(M.~ikle,

p. 28; Williams, p. 43).

Mrs. Williams

obviously gras?ed the meaning of the document inasmuch that
she admitted that she knew a physical examination was a
"requirement" :Jf the coverage (Williams p. 43).
The requirement of a medical examination was not a
surprise for

~

rs. Williams.

She knew that her husband's

condition incieased the risk because of the rated premium
imposed by Occ:idental in connection with the prior policy
(Meikle, p. 1.).

Mrs. Williams remembered that a physical

examination W:ts a "requirement" of the prior Occidental
policy

(Willi~ms,

p. 45).

Aside fr~m Mrs. Williams' unequivocal admission that
she knew that a medical examination was a requirement, and
her prior e~erience with medical examination requirements,
her actions cfter the death of her husband compel the
conclusion ttat she knew there was no coverage without the
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-21examination.

Subsequent to the death of the insured,

Mrs. Williams concealed her husband's death from the company
in the hope that a policy would be erroneously issued
(Bischoff, p. 36; Meikle, p. 66).

I f Nrs. Williams really

believed that the policy was in force, she would have
immediately submitted a claim.
Aside from the condition clearly noted in the Conditional
Receipt, the application which Hrs. Williams signed (Bischoff,
Exhibit 3) gave additional notice to Mrs. Williams that
coverage was not immediate.

On page two of the application,

just above the place where Mr. and Mrs. Williams affixed their
signatures there was a paragraph heading bearing the title
"Applicants Declaration."

It is therein noted that unless

otherwise stated in the Conditional Receipt, the coverage
will not be effective unless "the policy is delivered to the
owner during the life time . . . "

(Bischoff, Exhibit P-3).

Thus, the fact that coverage was not then effective
was transmitted to Mrs. Williams in four different forms:
(a) the wording of the Conditional Receipt (Bischoff, Exhibit
P-2);

(b) the wording of the "Applicants Declaration" in the

insurance application (Bischoff, Exhibit P-3);

(c) the offer

of insurance dated February 18, 1976 (Bischoff, Exhibit D-1);
and,

(d) the oral statements made by Allen Meikle to Mr. and

Mrs. Williams

(Neikle, pp. 30-31; Williams, 43).

Of greatest
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-22importance, is the fact that one or more of these sources
were effective since Mrs. Williams realized that a physical
examination was one of the requirements of the coverage
(Williams, p. 43).
Only one of these sources is claimed to be ambiguous,
and appellant has been unable to state the nature of the

ambiguity or the false impression that arises from a reading
of the language.
POINT III
ALLEN MEIKLE WAS THE AGENT OF MAVIS WILLIAMS
Many of appellant's arguments are based upon the propositiou

~hat

Allen Meikle was the agent of First Colony Life

Insurance Company.

This alleged agency relationship is merely

assumed by appellant.

No where does appellant offer any facts

or authorities in support of this assumption.
Before dealing with the particular points raised by
appellant which are based upon this assumption, respondent
will deal with the agency question separately rather than
repeating the argument each time that agency is assumed by
appellant.
A brief review of the circumstances of the case demonstrates
that at all times during the course of the transaction in
question, Allen Meikle was the agent of Mavis Williams and not
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-23the agent of First Colony.
As previously noted, Mrs. Williams and Mr. Heikle were
co-employees at Hill Air Force Base and the two had been
friends for approximately eight years before the transactions
herein described (Williams, p. 6).

Mrs. Williams was aware

that Mr. Meikle was an insurance agent and requested that he
attempt to locate coverage for her husband (Williams, pp. 1314).
At the time of Mrs. Williams' request, Allen Meikle was
an agent for Occidental Insurance Company (Meikle, p. 6).
He had never represented First Colony Life Insurance (Meikle,

p. 50).
Meikle obtained coverage with his principal company,
Occidental Life Insurance Company which was later cancelled
at the request of Mrs. Williams

(Williams pp. 19-21).

Subsequent to the cancellation, Meikle began looking
for replacement coverage.

He realized that coverage may

be difficult and sought the assistance of Kenneth Bischoff
who had previously assisted him in locating high risk
coverages (Meikle, pp. 15-16).

Mr. Bischoff, and his partner,

Lowell Smith, were agents of Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance and neither had theretofore been involved with
First Colony Life Insurance Company (Bischoff, pp.6-7, 52).
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-24Kenneth Bischoff contacted United Underwriters, the
local agent of First Colony Life.

United Underwriters sent

out inquiries to various companies.

On February 18, 1976,

United Underwriters received the offer of insurance from First
Colony Life (Bischoff, Exhibit D-1).
Accompanying the application was a "Single Case Agreement"
(Meikle, Exhibit D-3).

This is a contract used when insurance

is sold through a person who is not a party to a regular
agency agreement and is designed to define the rights iwth
respect to a single insurance transaction.
The Single Case Agreement was signed by Lowell Smith
(Kenneth Bischoff's partner) on April 22, 1976 (Meikle, Exhibit
D-3).

This was nine days after the application was signed

by Mrs. Williams and three days after the death of Dean
Williams.

Allen Meikle never did sign the Single Case Agreement

or any other agency agreement with First Colony or any of its
agents (Meikle, p. 49; Meikle, Exhibit D-3).

The only document

upon which Mr. Meikle's name appears is the last page of the
application where the percentage division of commissions is
noted (Bischoff, Exhibit 3).

Inasmuch as the application was

not signed by anyone until April 22, 1976, it is apparent that
on that date First Colony did not know Allen Heikle nor did it
know that he was involved in the transaction.
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-25It is apparent that in this transaction, Mr. Meikle
was acting as an "insurance broker. "

In Couch, Insurance 2d

§§25:92, 25:94, the author states:

"An 'insurance broker' is one who acts
as a middleman between the insured and the
insurer, and who solicits insurance from
the public under no employment from any special
company, and who, upon securing an order
places it with a company selected by the
insured, or, in the absence of such a selection
with the company selected by himself; whereas ~
'insurance agent' is one who represents an
insurer under an employment by it. Whether a
person acts as a broker or an agent is not
determined by what he is called but is to be
determined from what he does. In other words,
his acts determine whether he is an agent or
a broker. . . The fact that one is an i~sur
ance agent for some compankes, and, as such,
authorized to issue policies, etc., does not
prevent hkm from actkng merely as a broker
in procuring other insurance. Thks result is
not effected by the fact that the agent retained
a commission for placing the insurance."
(Emphasis added)
Mr. 11eikle' s status as a "broker" is further confirmed
by the description in Utah Code Annotated §31-17-2 (1953), as
amended:
"'Broker' means any person who, on behalf
of the insured, for compensation as an indepe~dent
contractor or commission, or fee, and not bekng
an agent of the insurer, solicits, negotiates,
or procures knsurance or reinsuranc~ or the
renewal or continuance thereof, or kn any ~anner
aids therein for insureds or for prospect7ve
insureds oth~r than himself . . . " (Emphasks added).
Compare the above definition with that of "agent", Utah Code
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-26Annotated §13-17-1 (1953).
Inasmuch as Meikle was acting as a broker rather than
as an agent for his company, the following authorities establish
that he became the agent of Mr. and Mrs. Williams and did not
act as an agent of First Colony Life Insurance Company.

The

status of brokers is clearly defined in the leading treatise
on the subject, Couch, Insurance 2d, §25.94:
"An insurance broker, like other brokers,
is primarily the agent of the first person who
employs him, and ~s therefore ordinarily the
agent of the insured as to matters connected
w~th the procurement of insurance, including
representat~ons and warranties.
Absent some
special condition or circumstances in the
particular case, a brokeris not the agent of
the insurer and may not be converted into an
agent for the insurer without some action on
the part of the insurer, or existence of some
facts by which his authority to represent it
may be fairly inferred. The circumstances
that, at the time the broker solicited business,
he did not know which insurance company would
issue the policy, and that the company which
subsequently did issue the policy had no prior
dealings with the broker, indeed, had not heard
of him, militate strongly against a conclusion
that the broker was acting as the agent for
such company.
If insurance is written in companies which
the agent does not represent, he is generally
regarded as acting as a broker and as the agent
of the insured in procuring insurance, whereas
if it is written in companies which he represents,
he is usually held to be the agent of the company
and not of the insured."
The proposition that a broker acts as an agent of the
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-27insured, is further noted in 43 American
J ur~sprudence
·
2d
•
§149:
"An insurance broker is primarily the
age~t o~ the first person who employs him, and

ord~nar~ly, where employed to procure insurance,
he becomes the agent of the person for whom the
insurance is procured, at least insofar as all
matters connected with the procurement itself
are concerned, with the consequence that his
acts and representations within the scope of
his authority are binding upon the insured.
It has been said that an insurance broker is
ordinarily employed by the person seeking insurance and when so employed, is to be distinguished
from the ordinary agent who is employed by
insurance companies to solicit and write insurance by and in the company. Upon similar
principles, an ordinary broker who ~s not the
agent of any insurance company, but procures
insurance of a company through its regular
agents, is the agent of the insured . . . "
(Emphasis added).

This Court has also adhered to the rule that negotiations
between an insurance salesman and a person seeking insurance
coverage creates an agency relationship between the two if
the salesman is not bound to place the insurance in a company
which he normally represents.

Barnett v. State Automobile and

Casualty Underwriters, 26 U.2d 169, 487 P.2d 311 (1971).
Accord, H & H Manufacturing Company v. Cimarron Insurance
Company, 302 s.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1957); France v. Citizens Casualty
Company, 79 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. 1948).
In Section IV of her Brief, the appellant cites several
cases which she claims supports the contention that Allen
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-28Meikle was acting as the agent of First Colony Life Insurance
Company.

However, none of the cited cases support the

proposition.
The case of Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Company v.
Carolina Gas Insurance Company, 402 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1968),
has no bearing on the issues involved here inasmuch as the
agents in that case had written insurance for the company on
a recurring basis.
in summary fashion.

The agency question was therefore resolved
There were no facts which gave rise to

a serious dispute as to agency and the affiliation between the
insurance companies and the agents was much greater than in
the instant case.
In Prassel Enterprises, Inc. v. All State Insurance
Company, 405 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1968), the question of agency
was discussed, but the factors considered in the agency
question do not exist in the instant case.

The case involved

the responsibility of a soliciting agent for failing to notify
the insurance company of a pending suit after having received
notice of the suit from the insured.

The affiliation between

the agent and the issuing company was much greater than in
the instant case.
The case of Houston Fire & Casualty Company v. Jones,
315 F.2d 116 (lOth Cir. 1963), involved a situation where the
alleged agent had been instructed in solicitation techniques
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-29and the use of binders by the issuing company.

By reason

of these instructions and prior association between the
agent and the company, the Court held that the agent had
implied authority to bind the company.

Inasmuch as Mr. Meikle

had no prior association whatsoever with the respondent in
this case prior to the application, the case has no bearing
on the issues before this Court.
In Pfiester v. Missouri State Life Insurance Company,
116 P,2d 245 (Kan. 1911), the issue was the extent of
limitation on an agent's authority rather than the existence
of agency.

The agent had a continuing affiliation with the

issuing company, a fact that is absent in the instant case.
The case of Denny v. Washington National Insurance
Company, 165 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. 1966), also involved a situation
wherein agent had a continuing affiliation with the company,
a situation not present in the instant case.
Appellant cites warner v. Continental Gas Company,
534 P.2d 695 (Okla. 1975) and Atlas Life Insurance Company
v. Eastman, 320 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1957) in support of the
proposition that a soliciting agent binds his principal with
respect to all acts within the apparent scope of his authority.
However, in both cases, the existence of agency was uncontested
·
t' ous affiliation
and there was ample evidence establish~ng a con ~nu
between the agents and the insurance companies.
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-30The case of Ferrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance
Company, 120 Utah 109, 232 P.2d 754 (1950), involved a
situation where a plaintiff applied for and was issued a fire
insurance policy with the defendant companies.
purchased this policy through Bowman.

Plaintiff

Certain facts

relevant to the risk of insuring the building were transmitted to Bowman, but Bowman did not transmit this information
to the insurance companies involved.

Bowman received the

application and transmitted the same to the general agent.
When the policy was issued, Bowman affixed his name to the
policy as the agent and thereafter serviced the policy by
receiving the monthly premiums and transmitting the funds to
the general agent.
The Court held that Bowman had implied authoirty of an
agent since he acted as though he were the general agent.
On this basis, this Court imputed the knowledge of Bowman to
the insurance companies.
The facts of the Ferrington case distinguish it from the
case now before the Court:
First, the Ferrington case involved mere imputing knowledge
of an agent to a principle whereas the instant case involves
an agent binding an insurance company to terms inconsistent
with the policy provisions.

The insurance companies in the
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Ferrington case clothed Bowman with such authority by permitting him to function in the manner outlined in the Court's
opinion.

Hmvever, in the instant case, the insurance company

did nothing to permit the proposed insured to reasonably assume
that Meikle had authority to bind the company to the policy.
On the contrary, the company took reasonable measures to
assure the proposed insured that Meikle has no such authority.
The Conditional Receipt (Bischoff, Exhibit 2) which was
delivered to

~rrs.

Williams at the time of the alleged oral

binder (Williams, p. 50; Meikle, p. 33) specifically stated
in the second paragraph:
"Neither the agent nor the medlcal
examiner is authorized to alter or waive
these conditions."
Thus, if Mrs. Williams erroneously regarded Heikle as an
agent of the company, she was notified that he had no authority
to bind the company to coverage.

For this reason, the opinion

in the Ferrington case has no bearing on the issues now before
the court.
Second, the insured in the Ferrington case had every reason
to believe that Bowman was a duly authorized agent for the
company.

In the instant case, Mrs. Wl'11'lams knew that Meikle

was an insurance broker (Williams, P· 13) and that the contained after Meikle "checked
templated coverage would be Ob
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-32around" with several companies (Williams, pp. 14, 16, 33).
Third, the insurance company in the Ferrington case
knew that Bowman was involved in the transaction and accepted
the benefits of his efforts.

One of the grounds for implying

agency, was that the company accepted the benefits and were
attempting to deny the corresponding liabilities.

In the

instant case, First Colony Life Insurance Company had no knowledge that Meikle was even involved in the transaction and
thus did not acquiesce in his involvement.

Moreover, inas-

much as a policy was never issued, the company received
no benefits from the acts of Mr. Meikle.
There are simply no acts or circumstances in the instant
case which could possibly be construed as giving Meikle
authority to bind First Colony Life Insurance Company to
coverage inconsistent with the terms of the proposed coverage.
On the contrary, the documents delivered to Mrs. Williams
specifically notified her that Mr. Meikle was not authorized
to make such a representation.
Appellant cites Long v. United Benefit Life Insurance
Company, 29 U.2d 204, 507 P.2d 375

(1973) as support for the

proposition that Meikle was the agent of First Colony so that
the company was committed to Meikle's oral binder of coverage.
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However, a brief reading of the Long case establishes that
the agents involved were clearly general agents of the
issuing company and the agency question was, therefore, not
contested.
There is no basis whatsoever in the instant case upon
which the trier of fact could determine that Mr. Meikle was
acting as the agent of First Colony Life Insurance Company.
On the date that the application was signed, he had not previously sold insurance for First Colony Life, he had never
communicated with First Colony Life, he had not written or
oral agency agreement with First Colony Life, he has not
to this date signed any contract with First Colony Life with
respect to this transaction and his involvement in the
transaction were totally unknown to First Colony Life.
Inasmuch as there is no basis to find Mr. Meikle the
agent of First Colony Life, the company cannot be held liable
on the basis of his statements of coverage or other activity
on his part.
POINT IV
ALL PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION WERE AWARE THAT
A MEDICAL EXAMINATION WAS A REQUIREMENT OF COVERAGE.
In Point II of appellant's Brief, it is argued that the
Court should consider facts outside the Conditional Receipt
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in order to determine the intent of the parties at the time
the Receipt was issued.

However, it should be noted, that

consideration of evidence other than the Receipt itself should
be made only if the wording of the Receipt is ambiguous.
Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal & Irrigation Company,
108 Utah 528, 162 P.2d 101 (1945); Oregon Short LineR. Co. v.
Idaho Stockyards Co., 12 U.2d 205, 364 P.2d 826

(1961).

As

previously noted (see Point II, supra), appellant has failed
to note any wording in the Conditional Receipt which would lead
a prospective insured to believe that coverage would begin at
any time prior to the physical examination.

For this reason,

the Court should not look beyond the wording of the Receipt to
determine the intent of the parties.

In the event the Court

does look to evidence outside the Conditional Receipt, the
facts establish that all parties intended coverage to begin
at the time of the physical examination.
Everyone associated with the contract knew that a
physical examination was a requirement of the coverage.

Allen

Meikle testified:
"Q.
Did you ever in that conversation
use the words 'firm offer'?
A.

Not to my recollection, no, Sir.

Q.

Did you regard that as a firm offer?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-35A.
I knew it wasn't a firm offer."
(Meikle, pp. 26-27).
Mr. Bischoff testified:
". . . then I found out that Mr
Williams had not completed the req~irements
and at that point, then, my counsel would
have been the policy is not in force and
I don't think the claim will be paid."
(Bischoff, p. 36).
As previously noted, Mavis Williams also testified that
she knew that a physical examination was a requirement of the
policy

(Williams, p. 43).

The best evidence of the intent of the parties is the
wording of the documents involved.

Continental Bank & Trust

Co. v. Bybee, 6 U.2d 98, 306 P.2d 773

\l955); Ephraim Theatre

Co. v. Hawk, 7 U.2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958).

In this regard,

the wording of the Conditional Receipt is incapable of any
reasonable interpretation other than coverage must await a
physical examination.

The language of the Receipt is quoted

on pages 6-7, supra.
The offer of insurance dated February 18, 1976, clearly
set forth the fact that there were certain requirements of
coverage.

Appellant has not contended that these words

are in any manner ambiguous.

A review of the "requirements"

in the offer establishes the absence of any ambiguity.
The offer of insurance was given by First Colony to
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-36Bischoff (Bischoff, p. 14) who carefully reviewed the requirements with Mr. Meikle (Bischoff, p. 16).

Mr. Meikle then

exhibited the document to Mr. and Mrs. Williams during their
meeting on April 13, 1976 (Meikle, pp. 27-28).
The lengthly explanation which Bischoff gave to Mr.
Meikle is significant inasmuch as the l<nowledge of Mr. Meikle
is attributed to Mrs. Williams (see agency argument, Point III).
In addition to the acknowledgement by Mrs. Williams
as to the requirements of coverage, her past experience
with respect to life insurance coverage for her husband supports
her full understanding as to the conditions of coverage.

Mrs.

Williams had been involved in a prior insurance application wiw
Mr. Meikle and understood that a physical examination was a
condition to that coverage (Williams, pp. 45-46).

There are

no statements or activities attributable to First Colony Life
which would lead to a different understanding with respect
to the policy in question.
By reason of the medical examination associated with the
first insurance policy, Mrs. Williarms was aware that there
were health problems that were significant for insurance
purposes

(Williams, pp. 25-32, 35).

This problem had caused

a long delay in locating coverage (Williams, pp. 25-32,35).
Certainly under these circumstances, no one could reasonably
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-37conclude that a physical examination was a meaningless
requirement.
The fact that an appointment was made for a medical
examination to be held on April 20, 1976, is inconsistent with
Mrs. Williams' claimed understanding that such an examination
was unnecessary.
Finally, if Mrs. Williams believed that an insurance
policy was in full force and effect on the date Mr. Williams
died, it is logical that she would have made a claim under
the policy immediately after his death.

Instead, she concealed

his death from First Colony Life in the hope that a policy
would be erroneously issued {Bischoff, p.

36; Meikle, p. 66).

POINT V
CONDITIONS OF COVERAGE WERE COMMUNICATED TO APPELLANT
In Section III of her Brief, appellant argues that
First Colony had a duty to communicate the limitations of
coverage to her and that the company failed to discharge
this duty.
Appellant cites Prince v. Western Empire Life Insurance
Company, 19 U.2d 174, 428 P.2d 163 (1967) and Ransom v. Penn
Mutual Life Insurance Company, 274 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1954), as
standing for the proposition that an insurance company has
a duty to explain limitations of the coverage.

However,
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-38neither of the cited cases supported that proposition.
In the Prince case, the Receipt delivered to the applicant
provided that coverage would commence on the date of the
medical examination.

Unlike the instant case, the applicant

submitted to the physical examination and the physician approved
his application.

However, due to some medical history, the

company requested further physical examinations.

While the

further medical examinations were being processed, the
applicant died.

The Court held that the policy became

effective upon completion of the first medical examination
as stated in the Conditional Receipt.
Inasmuch as the applicant in the instant case did not
complete his medical examination, the Prince case has no
bearing on the issues before the Court.

Moreover, no where

in the Prince opinion did the Court impose any duty upon an
insurance company to explain the limitations of coverage in
any more detail than stated in the Conditional Receipt.
In the Ransom case, the applicant also had submitted to
a medical examination and the physician found nothing wrong
with his physical condition.

The wording of the Receipt

in the Ransom case was much more involved than the Receipt
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-39involved in the instant case.

Moreover, there was language

in the Ransom Receipt from which one could conclude that coverage was applicable at the time of the payment of the premium.
Based upon that language, the Court held that the coverage
was in force at the time of the medical examination.

Inasmuch

as the insured in the Ransom case submitted to a physical
examination and the Ransom Receipt involved dissimilar wording,
the case has no bearing on the issues involved in this case.
None of the cases cited by appellant suggest an obligation
on the part of the company to explain limitations of its
coverage.

Even if such an obligation were imposed, it was

satisfied in the instant case.

The requirements for coverage

were clearly stated in the offer of insurance (Bischoff, Exhibit
1) ,

these conditions were explained by Bischoff to ~1eikle

(Bischoff, p.

16), Meikle clearly understood the conditions

(Meikle, pp. 26-27) and Heikle showed the offer to Mrs.
IVilliams

(rieikle, pp. 28-29).
POINT VI

APPELLffi~T HAS ABANDONED THE CLAIM THAT THE REPRESENTATIONS OF HR. MEIKLE ARE BINDING ON FIRST COLONY

Under Point IV of her brief, appellant argues that
the oral representations made by Hr. Heikle on April 13, 1976,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-40were binding on First Colony.

It should be noted, that this

is the first time that appellant has asserted this argument.
During the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, counsel
for appellant clearly and unequivocally stated that he did
not regard the oral representations by Mr. Meikle as being
binding on the insurance company.

During the course of the

hearing counsel stated:
" • • . looking at what would be the
ordinary person's interpretation of the
contract, Mrs. Williams has Mr. Heikle,
an agent, a licensed insurance agent,
telling her after her husband died, before
any medical examination, that there wouldn't
be any problem. Now, I guess, in conclusion what I can state is, No. 1, if
the Court views the wording in that Conditional Receipt to be unambiguous,
then certainly we should avoid going
fon~ard with the trial of this matter,
because if it is unambiguous then I
don't think the plaintiff really has a
claim against the insurance company."
Record 181.

"MR. McDONALD:
I would like to point
out one item in response, your Honor,
actually two.
I think as counsel has
indicated, if the Court finds that the
wording of the Conditional Receipt is
clear and unambiguous, as I understand
l1r. Ashton, that is the only basis of
your claim against the insurance company;
is that correct?
MR. ASHTON: Well, the other claim
as I have tried to describe is that the
insurance company is under an affirmative
obligation to instruct its agent, either
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-41personally or by written form of
the nature of coverage, and that wasn't
done in this case.
MR. McDONALD:

Hell, I suppose that

~ou would acknowledge that if the Receipt
~s clear then there is no need for an

explanation?
MR. ASHTON: Well, that's probably
true."
(Record 184-185)
The law is clear that an issue not submitted to the
trial court cannot be submitted for the first time on appeal.
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water and Irrigation Co., 118
Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577 (1950); Drummond v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 111 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903 (1947); State v. Larkin, 27
U.2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Tygesen v. Magna lvater Co.,
13 U.2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962).
To the extent the Court considers this contention of
appellant, it is apparent that the statements by Mr. Meikle
are not binding on First Colony inasmuch as Mr. Meikle was
acting as the agent of Mrs. Williams.

See authorities cited

under Point III, supra.
Even if Mr. Meikle had been acting as the agent for
First Colony, his representations would still not be binding
on the company.

At the time of the alleged representations

by t1r. Meikle, Mr. and Mrs. vlilliarns had in their possession
the original of the Conditional Receipt.
and unequivocally stated:

That Receipt clearly
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-42"Neither the agent nor the medical
examiner is authorized to alter or waive
these conditions."
The "conditions" which the agent could not waive was the
condition requiring medical examinations.
Utah Code Annotated §31-19-18 (1953), as amended,
provides:
"No insurer or its agent, nor any
solicitor or broker shall make any
contract of insurance or agreement as
to such contract, other than is plainly
expressed in the policy issued thereon.
Any such understanding or agreement not
so expressed shall be invalid."
The alleged statement by Mr. Meikle as to the existence of
coverage was diametrically opposed to the clearly stated
conditions precedent to the coverage, and such statement was
therefore invalid.
As noted under Point III, supra, Allen Meikle was the
agent of Mavis Williams and not First Colony Life.

Thus, any

false impression created by his alleged oral binder cannot
be asserted against First Colony Life.
POINT VII
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS HAVE BEEN SATISFIED
Appellant argues under Point V, that public policy requires
that an insurance company be bound by the oral representations
of its agents.
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-43This is another point raised by appellant for the
first time on appeal.

Public policy considerations were not

pleaded nor argued during the course of the Motion for Summary
Judgment.

For that reason, such arguments should not be

considered in this Court (see authorities cited under Point
VI, supra) .
First Colony has no reason to contest appellant's public
policy argument.

No one in this action has alleged that

First Colony's agent made any

m~sleading

statements to Mrs.

Williams.
Respondent's local agent, United Underwriters, made no
false or misleading statements tc Hrs. lhlliams.

Its only

communication occurred by its transmission of the application
and offer of insurance to Mr. Bischoff.
Appellant has not alleged that Mr. Bischoff or Mr. Lowell
Smith were agents of First Colony Life.

Even if they were

considered agents, they made no false or misleading statements
to Mrs. Williams.

Their only communication occurred when Mr.

Bischoff transmitted the offer of insurance and application to
Hr. Meikle and called his attention to the requirements of the
coverage.
The only other individual involved is Mr. Meikle, who is
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-44obviously the agent of Mrs. Williams and not the agent of
First Colony Life (see Point III, supra).
CONCLUSION
Despite the several legal issues involved in this
case, the factual situation is rather simple.

Mr. and Mrs.

Williams made an application for life insurance to First
Colony Insurance Company.

At the time of the application,

both were aware that he suffered from some physical ailments
which were significant for insurance purposes.

At the time

of their application, they had been denied coverage for these
health reasons and had received a rated premium policy which
they found unsatisfactory.
In these circumstances Mrs. Williams received an offer
of insurance from First Colony which required a medical examination.

Such a requirement should not come as a surprise to any

reasonable person, especially when experienced in the previous
attempts to locate coverage.
A belief that First Colony Life, or any other company,
would accept the risk of an insured with a known medical
problem without first determining the extent of the risk is
simply unreasonable regardless of the wording of any particular
document.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-45Aside from the circumstances of the case, it is undisputed
that Mrs. Williams received the Conditional Receipt, the offer
of insurance and the application, all of which specifically
noted that there were conditions and requirements to coverage.
Under such circumstances, the summary judgment granted
by the lower court should be sustained.

~s
. day of October, 1978.

Respectfully Submitted
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